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PREfAcE
Woodrow Wilson once said, "i not only use all the brains that i have, but all that i can borrow." there is a persistent threat to the united states from foreign collectors that continually try to borrow "brains" and steal intellectual property belonging to the u.s. cleared industrial base. our adversaries target the cleared industrial base to gain a technological edge and compromise our data. they target technology, personal information, computer networks, and military systems. information and technology lost to these foreign collectors imperil the lives of our warfighters and the nation's economic wellbeing.
the defense security service (dss) is chartered to oversee the protection of u.s. and foreign technologies and classified information resident in the cleared industrial base under the authority of the national industrial security Program and its assigned counterintelligence (ci) mission. a critical component of securing the cleared industrial base is the partnership between cleared industry and dss in protecting information and technology.
cleared contractors recognize potential collection attempts and report these attempts to dss. dss receives these reports, analyzes them to identify foreign collectors targeting u.s. cleared industry, and works to disrupt foreign collection operations directly and in concert with other government agencies. in fiscal year 2014 (FY14), DSS received over 34,000 reports from industry, an 8 percent increase from the previous fiscal year. From these reports, 989 subjects of investigation or operations were identified, which is a 38 percent increase over fy13.
dss also uses industry reporting to develop analytical assessments to articulate the threat to u.s. information and technology. this annual publication, Targeting U.S. Technologies: A Trend Analysis of Cleared Industry Reporting reflects the compilation and analysis of the reports received during FY14. DSS produces analytic products, including this report, to improve cleared industry's and U.S. government agencies' awareness of who targets cleared industry, what they target, and the methodologies they employ in attempts to gain access to restricted information and technology.
dss has a responsibility to our partners in cleared industry to provide them with a clear picture of the threat posed by foreign collectors targeting their facilities and personnel. any time our foes access classified data there is an increased threat to the warfighter, since those adversaries can use that technology to develop countermeasures to our systems or create weapons of greater lethality. dss intends this publication to provide cleared employees, companies, law enforcement, and intelligence professionals a better understanding of the threat we all face. the more we understand the threat, the better chance we have of thwarting our enemies.
increased awareness of the technology targeted and the methods our adversaries use enables us to better identify and prevent future illicit attempts. Foreign collectors' attempts to infiltrate the cleared industrial base can be thwarted by a team effort between dss, cleared contractors, and law enforcement and intelligence agencies. a constant awareness of the threat, vigilance on behalf of industry, and diligent support from dss ensures our country remains strong, healthy, and secure. and what methods of collection it used. comprehensive analysis of information from across all companies and elements of cleared industry forms the basis for this report, and determines the actions dss takes and the advice it gives to cleared contractors to combat the threat.
cleared contractor reporting provides information concerning actual, probable, or possible espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or subversion activities to the federal bureau of investigation and dss. When indicated, dss refers cases of ci concern to its partners in the law enforcement and intelligence communities for potential exploitation or neutralization. dss follows up by informing industry of remedial actions that can decrease the threat in the future. this builds awareness and understanding of the individual and collective threats and actions and informs our defenses.
ThE REPoRT
department of defense (dod) instruction 5200.39, Critical Program Information Protection within the DoD, dated May 29, 2015, requires dss to publish an annual classified and unclassified report, each detailing suspicious contacts occurring within the cleared contractor community. the focus of this report is on efforts to compromise or exploit cleared personnel, or to obtain unauthorized access to sensitive or classified information and technologies resident in the u.s. cleared industrial base.
Each year dss publishes Targeting U.S. Technologies: A Trend Analysis of Cleared
Industry Reporting (Trends) . in this report, the 17th annual Trends, dss provides a snapshot of its findings on foreign collection attempts. it provides a statistical and trend analysis that covers the most prolific foreign collectors targeting the cleared contractor community during fy14, compares that information to the previous year's report, and places that comparison into a larger context. DoD Instruction 5200.39 requires DSS to provide its reports to the dod ci community, national entities, the defense contractor community, and dod component heads. This report constitutes part of DSS' ongoing effort to assist in better protecting the cleared industrial base by raising general threat awareness, encouraging the reporting of incidents as they occur, identifying specific technologies at risk, and applying appropriate countermeasures. dss intends the report to be a ready reference tool for security professionals in their efforts to detect, deter, mitigate, or neutralize the effects of foreign targeting. dss previously released a classified version of this report.
ScoPE/METhoDoLogY
dss considers all reports collected from the cleared contractor community. it then applies analytical processes to them, including the dss foreign intelligence threat assessment methodology. after sorting all reports into the three categories-suspicious contact report (scr), unsubstantiated contact report (ucr) , and assessed no value-we base this publication on scrs and select ucrs. the analyses also incorporate references to all-source intelligence community (ic) reporting.
the Trends is organized first by region, then by targeted technology, methods of operation (MO), and collector affiliation (see Appendix for descriptions). it incorporates statistical and trend analyses on each of these areas.
dss analysts review the scrs and ucrs of ci concern to determine the threat level the incident poses to actually compromise cleared industry personnel or obtain access to technology or information resident in DEfENSE SEcURITY SERvIcE REPoRTINg DEfINITIoNS dss sorts each report received from cleared industry pursuant to section 1-302b of the nisPom into one of three distinct categories: suspicious contact report (scr), unsubstantiated contact report (ucr), or assessed no value (anv). subsequent information and reevaluation may cause changes in these categorizations, e.g., an scr may change to a ucr.
ScR -a report dss receives from cleared industry that contains indicators that it is almost certain, or likely, or there is an even chance that some individual, regardless of nationality, attempted to obtain unauthorized access to sensitive or classified information and technology or to compromise a cleared employee. reports designated as scrs represent incidents most likely to have involved actual attempts to do so.
UcR -a report of an incident in which it is unlikely that any individual, regardless of nationality, attempted to obtain unauthorized access to sensitive or classified information and technology or compromised a cleared employee. however, dss retains such reports, as the aggregate of several ucrs or information obtained subsequently may result in the identification of foreign intelligence activity.
ANv -a report that only remotely represents a ci concern, such as an email or credit card scam. dss does not retain reporting assessed as anv.
TARgETINg U.S. TEchNoLogIES
BAckgRoUND cleared industry. the analysts assess each incident based on the actor, action, and targeted technology and apply a threat rating of low, medium, high, or critical to each of the three categories. the combined ranking of the three categories determines the threat score for each report. therefore, each report that analysts consider of ci concern will have an overall threat ranking of low, medium, high, or critical.
In this year's report, DSS for the first time ranked the regions by the aggregate threat score of all reports associated to that region instead of ranking them based solely on the raw number of reports (see appendix for more information). Previously, dss ranked the regions by the share or percentage of the total number of reports for the year.
The weighted ranking represents the region's share of the aggregate threat score of all reports for fy14. for example, entities from the East Asia and the Pacific region accounted for 38 percent of all reports in fy14; however, the threat score for reports associated with this region represented 41 percent of the total weighted score for the reports in fy14. thus, the ranking represents the assessed threat to u.s. technologies posed by entities from a region not just the volume of incidents associated to those entities.
the weighted ranking system did not cause a shift in the order of the regions as collectors; however, it did impact the comparative threat ranking. the near East was the second most common collector region identified in 21 percent of the incidents, while the south and central asia region account for 15 percent of the incidents, just 6 percent fewer than the near East. however, when comparing the threat score, the 6 percent difference in raw number of incidents increases to 14 percent, with near East accounting for 25 percent of the overall aggregate score and the south and central asia entities accounting for just 11 percent. This indicates the incidents involving entities from the near East tended to pose a greater actual threat of transfer of information or technology. because dss bases these assessments on incomplete and at times fragmentary information, they do not constitute facts nor provide proof, nor do they represent empirically based certainty or knowledge. Some analytical judgments are based directly on collected information, others rest on previous judgments, and both types serve as building blocks. in either variety of judgment, the agency may not have evidence showing something to be a fact or that definitively links two items or issues.
Intelligence judgments pertaining to likelihood are intended to reflect the approximate level of probability of a development, event, or trend. assigning precise numerical ratings to such judgments would imply more rigor than the agency intends.
the chart below provides a depiction of the relationship of terms used to each other.
the report uses probably and likely to indicate that there is a greater than even chance of an event happening. however, even when the authors use terms such as remote and unlikely they do not intend to imply that an event will not happen. the report uses phrases such as we cannot dismiss, we cannot rule out, and we cannot discount to reflect that, while some events are unlikely or even remote, their consequences would be such that they warrant mentioning.
dss uses words such as may and suggest to reflect situations in which DSS is unable to assess the likelihood of an event, generally because relevant information is sketchy, fragmented, or nonexistent.
In addition to using words within a judgment to convey degrees of likelihood, dss also assigns analytic confidence levels based on the scope and quality of information supporting DSS judgments:
High Confidence
• Well-corroborated information from proven sources, minimal assumptions, and/or strong logical inferences
• generally indicates that dss based judgments on high-quality information, and/or that the nature of the issue made it possible to render a solid judgment
Moderate Confidence
• Partially corroborated information from good sources, several assumptions, and/or a mix of strong and weak inferences
• generally means that the information is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence
Low Confidence
• uncorroborated information from good or marginal sources, many assumptions, and/or mostly weak inferences
• Generally means that the information's credibility or plausibility is questionable, or that the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or that we have significant concerns or problems with the sources to date, chain rEaction task force efforts have led to the identification of numerous u.s. companies, primarily independent distributors and brokerage entities that import microelectronics from known or highly suspected overseas counterfeit shippers. importers of counterfeit microelectronics are mostly small businesses operating as independent distributors or brokers, many of which publicly associate themselves with the dod and pride themselves as being able to provide obsolete or rare microelectronic components.
after reviewing reporting from cleared industry, DSS identified multiple interactions between cleared contractors and the u.s. companies identified as part of CHAIN rEaction. many of these interactions were attempts to solicit cleared contractors for business or attempts to procure exportcontrolled microelectronics for various foreign government entities. many of these u.s. companies are under criminal investigation for either counterfeit importation or export violations; eight have been debarred and three convicted in criminal court.
ExAMPLES fRoM cLEARED coNTRAcToRS
after examining reporting from cleared industry, dss cataloged numerous interactions between cleared contractors and entities suspected of doing business at the behest of foreign government end users. notable examples include:
• a commercial broker that has contracts with the dod has provided counterfeit microelectronics to a cleared contractor and openly conducts business with foreign customers. in one incident, this entity attempted to procure exportcontrolled microelectronics, likely for a foreign government-affiliated end user.
• multiple cleared contractors have had interactions with a known foreign government procurement agent. this entity also imports microelectronics from known or suspected overseas counterfeiters.
• one microelectronics brokerage entity attempted to procure export-controlled radiation-hardened integrated circuits. the individual who requested the parts previously plead guilty to willfully engaging in brokering activities or facilitating the export and transfer of defense articles and defense services, specifically brokering the export of thermal imaging and infrared technology to entities in the East asia and the Pacific region. This microelectronics brokerage entity also has multiple dod contracts.
• several independent distributors or brokerage entities contacted a
TERMS USED IN ThIS SEcTIoN
gray market: the trade of a commodity primarily via independent distributors and brokers that, while legal, is unofficial, unauthorized, or unintended by the original manufacturer counterfeits: substandard, substituted, or cloned microelectronics that are often of low quality and unable to perform to required specifications.
fIgURE 5: PREvALENcE of oBSoLETE MIcRoELEcTRoNIcS
Microelectronics obsolescence is not just a sustainment issue. A recent Institute for Defense Analyses study found that a significant number of technologies in the development and production phases incorporate obsolete microelectronics.
During the sustainment phase, at least 63% of microelectronics are either discontinued or at risk of being discontinued.
SUSTAINMENT DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION
During the initial acquisition process, at least 21% of microelectronics are either discontinued or at risk of being discontinued. TARgETINg U.S. TEchNoLogIES SPEcIAL focUS AREA cleared contractor and attempted to fraudulently purchase microelectronics. these entities also used the cleared contractor's corporate identity in attempt to spoof real business.
coNcLUSIoN
it is essential that cleared industry remains vigilant and continues to report these types of suspicious interactions originating from independent microelectronics distributors and brokerage entities.
as the reporting from cleared industry indicates, location alone does not define what is suspicious. foreign intelligence services and research institutes are using u.s.-based independent distributors and brokerage entities to acquire exportcontrolled microelectronics. often, these same u.s.-based businesses are supplying counterfeit or otherwise substandard microelectronic parts to cleared contractors and the dod.
through increased ci awareness, vigilance, and commercial due diligence, cleared contractors can increasingly identify these illicit actors and reduce the overall threat posed by these entities.
Analyst comment: DSS assesses it is almost certain foreign intelligence entities (fIEs) possess the capability to introduce non-conforming or malicious microelectronics into the supply chains of cleared industry. however, DSS lacks sufficient specific information to determine whether fIEs intend to exploit the vulnerabilities inherent within cleared industry's supply chains. (Confidence level: high)
PagE intEntionally lEft blank fIgURE 6: MIcRoELEcTRoNIc SEcURITY TIPS cleared contractors should place greater scrutiny or increased awareness in the following areas:
BE WARY OF LOW PRICES
Microelectronic parts offered at prices significantly lower than prices offered at authorized distributors.
BE WARY OF SHORTER LEAD TIMES
Microelectronic parts offered with lead times significantly shorter than those from the original equipment manufacturer (OEM).
VET EXTERNAL TESTING HOUSES
When using an external testing house for counterfeit detection, ensure that the facility is an established, trusted entity.
VISUAL DETECTION MAY NOT BE ENOUGH
Counterfeiting techniques have advanced significantly over the last 5 years; visual detection or solvent testing may not be enough to determine whether a part is counterfeit or genuine.
CONSIDER LIFETIME BUYS
Contractors should consider lifetime buys. OEMs publicize that they will discontinue a part roughly 1 year in advance. If those parts may be needed in the future, the upfront costs of a lifetime buy may outweigh the risks and overall costs of doing business in the hard-to-find and obsolete microelectronics gray market. in fy14 industry reporting, the preferred mo was academic solicitation, representing 24 percent of the total. the other favored mos included solicitation or marketing services, aat, and sna. the solicitation or marketing services and aat mos showed an increase from fy13, which continues the trend towards more human-enabled targeting.
Collector affiliations for FY14 showed a significant change from FY13. In FY14, the number of cases attributed to commercial collectors increased by 11 percent. another noteworthy change was an 18 percent decrease in the number of reports attributed to government collectors, which dropped this category from first to fourth place.
TARgETED TEchNoLogIES
East Asia and the Pacific entities targeted virtually every category on the ibtl in fy14. the top targeted technology in fy14 remained electronics, followed in order by c4, aeronautic systems, software, and marine systems. also of note, analysis identified no IBTL technology in 35 percent of cases, and the targeted technology remained unknown in 12 percent of cases. The East Asia and the Pacific practice of using the academic solicitation mo as part of long-term efforts to develop a knowledge base that can support development of emerging technologies was apparent in relation to many of the targeted technologies. Many East Asia and the Pacific academics leverage their placement to gain knowledge that allows regional states to advance r&d cycles by integrating basic capabilities into advanced military research projects. These areas of research included marine systems, nanotechnology, and materials: raw and processed. access to u.s. information and technology through academic placement continues to be an area of concern.
METhoDS of oPERATIoN
The number of East Asia and the Pacificconnected academic solicitation cases increased by nearly 17 percent, its share of incidents increased by 4 percent in fy14, making it the most prevalent mo. the use of solicitation or marketing services and aat also experienced slight increases in fy14, making these mos second and third respectively. The most significant change in MOs was East Asia and the Pacific entities use of sna, which dropped from the most common mo to fourth place. fy14 reporting from cleared industry revealed an increase in East asia and the Pacific collectors requesting positions in universities or research programs with a military focus. continued use of this mo provided evidence of a long-range, forwardthinking approach to promoting indigenous technology development. a bulk of East Asia and the Pacific solicitations sought postgraduate research positions related to a variety of topics that included electronics, software, and aeronautic systems. East Asia and the Pacific actors, which resulted in the temporary cessation or reduced use of existing sna tactics and infrastructure. reporting cataloged much of the infrastructure; command and control protocols; and tactics, techniques, and procedures East Asia and the Pacific cyber actors used. other government agencies also provided industry with additional technical indicators that can help identify suspicious activity.
East Asia and the Pacific CNE tactics constantly evolve as various sets of regional cyber actors learn from previous efforts, progress in their skills, and become more active. East asia and the Pacific methodologies reflect increasingly sophisticated technical capabilities and intelligence practices. East asia and the Pacific actors continue to defeat cleared industry network defenses. fortunately, community reporting of sna against cleared contractors provides indications and warnings to aid in mitigating and alerting others to planned or ongoing activity. in fy14, spear phishing remained a common cyber activity used by East asia and the Pacific actors to gain initial access to networks. other activities included website exploitation, compromised credentials, network scanning, brute-force attacks, and distributed denial of service. it is important for network defenders to determine the method used to deliver malware since knowing the delivery method allows network defenders to defeat some attacks. many of the request for information (rfi) collection attempts consisted of email or web-card requests for price quotes, export requirements, or product specifications. In many cases, the requestor did not identify the end user or was vague about the intended application. East asia and the Pacific entities also continued to use the foreign visit mo. countries from the region that succeed in establishing favorable trade relationships with the united states gain significant access to cleared industry. In numerous reported cases in fy14, visiting delegations included known or suspected intelligence officers (IOs).
coLLEcToR AffILIATIoNS
reports attributed to commercial entities were the highest they have been in the last 5 years. commercial collectors can serve as nonofficial collectors of U.S. technology, often with ties back to ris or state militaries. another pattern in cleared industry reporting involved various East Asia and the Pacific companies that requested to purchase u.s. information and technology but resisted providing end-user and end-use data, often in an attempt to mask a military-affiliated end user.
Compared to the commercial affiliation, government-affiliated rose in share by about 4 percent. in fy14, reports citing the government-affiliated category often resulted from East Asia and the Pacific university researchers and students submitting resumes. academics seeking internships and postdoctoral positions continuously submitted resumes for positions within u.s. defense programs. In FY14, government-affiliated entities also included ris and state-owned enterprises. although many ris work on commercial or dual-use technologies, they are also primary contributors to their countries' military r&d. the ic assessed that any technology shared with them is at risk and could be incorporated into the production lines of one or more East Asia and the Pacific militaries.
reported cases attributed to individual collectors experienced only a slight increase in fy14. Even with a slight increase in cases, this affiliation's share of the total remains relatively low because dss is often able to identify some connection between individuals and a commercial company, government, or government-affiliated RI. The group with the greatest change was government collectors. reports linked to government collectors decreased more than 18 percent in fy14, dropping this affiliation from first to fourth. 
METhoDS of oPERATIoN
during fy14, and similar to the previous 3 years, academic solicitation remained the most prominent mo used by near East collectors, accounting for 42 percent of industry submissions. the next nearest category was aat at 16 percent.
The majority of academic solicitations to cleared industry involved near East students seeking research positions at u.s. universities involved in sensitive and/or classified research for the DoD. According to ic reporting, near East regimes leverage placement in academic positions in order to facilitate collection efforts against emerging u.s. dod and civilian technical research.
as in fy13, aat remained the second most common mo used in fy14, remaining at 16 percent. near East entities attempted to acquire a variety of export-controlled enabling technologies, often focusing on aeronautic systems. additional reporting indicates near East procurement agents were often reluctant to provide end-user or end-use information, obscuring the ultimate recipient.
Analyst comment: Restricted Near East end users almost certainly exploit third country procurement agents or lax export control systems to circumvent U.S. trade controls. (Confidence Level: Moderate)
the rfi and foreign visit mos experienced a slight increase in fy14; however, the most significant change in MO was the employment of sna. near East cnE programs continue to evolve along with improving tactics, techniques, and procedures. While some near East cnE programs are associated with their governments, others are linked to information technology companies. coLLEcToR AffILIATIoNS in fy14, dss attributed 43 percent of reported collection activity to governmentaffiliated collectors. While this was a slight decrease from FY13, government-affiliated collectors remained the most active-a consistent trend from previous years. these collectors continued to be associated with government-linked firms or public universities.
near East reports saw a slight increase in commercial entities targeting u.s. technology and information. similar to previous years, commercial collectors remained the second most active in the near East at 26 percent, the lowest share among the four main collector regions.
it is worth noting that much of the collection activity traceable to the near East has historically come through procurement networks consisting of front companies and third-party intermediaries. however, near East collectors have also successfully employed several different mos in order to acquire u.s. information and technology. 
METhoDS of oPERATIoN
There was not a significant change in the mos used by south and central asia collectors for fy14. seeking employment and academic solicitation remained the top two mos. although seeking employment decreased in the share of reporting, together these two mos still account for 65 percent of all fy14 industry reports of incidents attributed to south and central asia entities. aat and rfi remained commonly used mos, accounting for 15 and 10 percent, respectively.
the reported incidents involving seeking employment and academic solicitation largely consisted of south and central asia collectors requesting research positions at cleared contractor components of academic institutions and applying for positions in cleared industry. Commercial and government-affiliated entities were the top two collectors supplying restricted end users. While governmentaffiliated collectors remained the second most prevalent in FY14, this affiliation showed a 4 percent decrease in the share of reporting from FY13. Government-affiliated collectors often consisted of students, researchers, and professors from regional institutions of higher learning. governmentaffiliated entities were also commercial companies attempting to fulfill tenders and procure technology on behalf of national military services or other governmental organizations.
The most noteworthy change in affiliations occurred in the individual category. reports involving individual collectors decreased by nearly 24 percent in fy14, dropping this affiliation from first to third overall. Individual collectors primarily consisted of job seekers who applied for positions throughout cleared industry, often in response to vacancy announcements from cleared contractors that clearly state requirement for u.s. citizenship or a security clearance for sensitive positions. slight decrease in the number of cases, AAT's share was 22 percent of total reporting in fy14. common approaches consisted of sending direct, forthright, and specific emails seeking to purchase technology. Europe and Eurasia employed the solicitation or marketing services mo almost as often as aat in fy14, making it the second most common at 21 percent. the use of this mo increased its portion by 16 percent from fy13. in some instances, Europe and Eurasia companies contacted cleared contractors with offers to act as their agent or distributor in the region, while others proposed collaboration on r&d in overlapping areas or joint commercial ventures.
the next most commonly reported mo in fy14 was rfi, also at 21 percent. Europe and Eurasia entities generally used email for their rfis, sending questions regarding the cleared contractor's technology. The subject matter of the inquiries ranged from pricing information to technical details and capabilities.
the foreign visit mo almost doubled its portion from fy13 to fy14; making it the fourth most common mo. visitors to cleared contractors often comprised an official delegation that sometimes included known or suspected ios.
together, the top four mos account for four-fifths of all reporting attributed to Europe and Eurasia. sna showed a slight increase from fy13; however, its share of the reporting remained below 10 percent. despite the numbers, Europe and Eurasia entities maintain highly sophisticated cyber programs that have a long history of conducting cyber operations at a level that presents a persistent and primary threat to u.s. systems.
coLLEcToR AffILIATIoNS
For the past 5 years, commercial affiliated entities remained the top collectors. in FY14, the commercial affiliation experienced a 9 percent increase in the total share of reporting. many countries from the region are allies of the united states and are comparable with regard to level of economic development, industrial infrastructure, and innovative ability. The next three collector affiliationsgovernment, government-affiliated, and individual -each accounted for 14 percent of total reporting. government collectors experienced a slight increase, which moved this affiliation from fourth to second in FY14. Government-affiliated collectors included research and educational institutions with government connections.
the most notable change in collector affiliations involved the individual category. In FY14, the individual collector affiliation decreased its share of reporting by 17 percent, dropping it from the second most common collector affiliation in FY13 to 
WESTERN hEMISPhERE
suspicious incidents reported by cleared industry associated with entities in the Western hemisphere increased by 35 percent in fy14 over fy13. these entities accounted for 7 percent of cleared industry reporting in fy14. Western hemisphere entities have been consistent in targeted technologies and the methods they employ in their attempts to obtain information and technology from cleared industry.
based on industry reporting, Western hemisphere collectors continued to most frequently target electronics, c4, and aeronautic systems. fy14 was the third consecutive year that dss attributed these entities with most frequently targeting electronics. during the past 3 years, Western hemisphere entities have targeted electronics in over 14 percent of their reported collection attempts. in fy14, commercial entities requesting information from cleared contractors or attempting to purchase technology accounted for over 70 percent of collection attempts originating in this region and targeting electronics.
Entities from this region have consistently targeted c4, and its militarily critical technologies list (mctl) predecessor information systems, as one of the top three most sought after technologies for the past 5 years. similarly, aeronautic systems technology has remained one of the top four most targeted technologies by these entities in each of the past 5 years.
Western hemisphere collectors relied heavily on rfi, as it has been the most used mo by these collectors in each of the last 5 years. in fy14, these collectors applied this approach in one-third of their attempts to collect information and technology from cleared industry. for the past 2 years, solicitation or marking services and aat were the second and third most common approaches. collectively, for the past 2 years these three mos have accounted for over 65 percent of the suspicious contacts dss attributed to collectors from the Western hemisphere.
For the past 5 years, the top three affiliations for collectors from this region have remained consistent with commercial the most common affiliation, followed by individual, and unknown. in addition, collectors from these affiliations account for over 94 percent of the incidents originating in the Western hemisphere targeting electronics, c4, and aeronautic systems. analysts also applied a threat rating of low, medium, high, or critical to each of the three categories. the combined ranking of the three categories determined the threat score for each report. therefore, each report that analysts consider of ci concern has an overall threat score of low, medium, high, or critical. the threat score represents the likelihood that a foreign entity acquired the information or targeted technology, the value of the technology to the adversary, and the consequence of the loss to u.s. national security. this appendix explains the weighted ranking system and demonstrates the impact of threat scoring.
As this is the first year SCRs received a threat score, dss did not use the threat score in fy14 to compare to data from previous years. Within each region, analysts continued to use the percentage of reported incidents to identify the top targeted technologies, MOs, and collector affiliation. However, dss did apply the weighted threat score for ranking the regions' overall threat to U.S. technologies in fy14.
to apply the threat score to the overall data set, reports received a weighted rank based on the analysts' threat score for the reported incident.
in the weighted ranking, the aggregate of all the reports' threat scores replaces the total number of reports in determining the risk to a technology. the threat score for an individual region, or the risk posed to a specific technology, is the share of this aggregate score. for example, entities from the East Asia and the Pacific region accounted for 38 percent of all reports in fy14; however, the threat score for reports associated with this region represented 41 percent of the total weighted score for the reports in fy14. this higher threat score is due to dss identifying entities from this region in a large portion of the incidents rated as critical and high. of all the reports dss rated as critical, dss associated 76 percent to the East asia and the Pacific region. DSS also attributed 63 percent of the reports rated as high to this region.
applying the weighted ranking to fy14 data further identified electronics as the targeted technology most at risk from foreign collectors. Electronics was the only ibtl category with a threat score that varied more than one point from the percentage of all reports. foreign collectors targeted electronics in 7 percent of the incidents. however, electronics weighted threat score was 11 percent of the aggregate threat score.
collectors targeting electronics more often applied mos that posed a greater risk of actual transfer of technology or information. foreign collectors used aat in 57 percent of the incidents targeting electronics. aat had the highest weighted threat score of any mo. This contributed to electronics, just one of 29 ibtl categories, being a targeted technology in 41 percent of the incidents rated as critical.
collectors using aat or sna posed a greater threat to u.s. technologies than those using the most common mo, academic solicitation. Both AAT and SNA's weighted threat score exceeded their percentage of incidents, while academic solicitation's threat score was significantly less than the percentage of incidents using this mo.
academic solicitation is the most common mo; it largely involves individuals outside of the united states submitting applications to universities and research labs, or academic papers to subject matter experts. Rarely does academic solicitation involve an individual having direct access to information or technology in cleared industry. in fy14, dss analysts rated no incidents involving academic solicitation as critical, and academic solicitation was the mo in less than 2 percent of the incidents rated as high.
after dss has several years of applying this new methodology it will be possible to assess the trends of targeting u.s. technologies based on the estimated risk posed to the technology. the application of weighted ranking should provide greater insight to the actual risk foreign collectors pose to specific technologies resident in cleared industry. it will likely improve threat awareness and place greater scrutiny on entities using the higher risk mos. 
DIREcTED ENERgY
directed energy is the use of various forms of energy transferred from a system or weapon to a target to produce a lethal or non-lethal effect. although a laser is considered directed energy, laser information and technology falls in a separate laser category.
ELEcTRoNIcS
Electronics is the study and engineering of electrical circuits and components. Electronics are the building blocks for almost all technologies, and each system may contain hundreds if not thousands of electronics performing a specific function to ensure the operation of a system.
ENERgETIc MATERIALS
Energetic materials are a group of materials that have a high amount of stored chemical energy. research in this category focuses on metamaterials and plasmonics.
ENERgY SYSTEMS
Energy systems provide power to use or propel equipment. simply put, energy system technologies are engines, generators, and batteries.
gRoUND SYSTEMS
ground systems include combat and non-combat vehicle designs and capabilities. this includes the engines and transmissions used to maneuver ground systems.
LASERS
A laser is a device that emits focused, amplified light due to the stimulated emission of photons. the term laser is an acronym originating from the phrase light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation. two critical components to lasers -energy systems and optics -are organized in other categories.
MANUfAcTURINg EqUIPMENT & MANUfAcTURINg PRocESSES
Equipment that machines, cuts, folds, shapes, or prints elements and materials to a technology design or engineered specifications. In addition, different machines serving different purposes may be organized in a manner to add efficacy to a manufacturing process.
MARINE SYSTEMS
marine systems include combat and non-combat marine vessel designs and capabilities.
MATERIALS: RAW & PRocESSED
raw material is the basic material from which a product is manufactured or made. raw materials that undergo an industrial processing procedure before delivery to a consumer or customer are considered processed materials.
MEDIcAL technology used to research, diagnose, and treat disease, medical, and genetic conditions affecting humans.
NANoTEchNoLogY nanotechnology is the study and science of manipulating matter at the atomic or slightly larger molecular level. nanotechnology has future application in a broad list of professions and industries: medicine, biology, electronics (including semiconductor physics), energy, etc. most applications in this area are emerging; however, any technology engineered to function at a molecular scale is considered nanotechnology. functions can be as simple as giving electrons a defined, less resistant path to travel.
NUcLEAR
information or technology related to using atomic nucleuses to produce energy or weapons. also included in this category are nuclear storage, nuclear detection, and nuclear protection technologies -minus radiation-hardened electronics.
oPTIcS optics is the study of the behavior of light and its interactions with matter and the development of equipment to detect light. although other portions of the electromagnetic spectrum exhibit similar refractive, reflective, and defractive properties of light, the optics categories refers to the study and detection of light in the visible, ultraviolet, and infrared portions of the electromagnetic spectrum.
PoSITIoNINg, NAvIgATIoN, & TIME
Positioning is the ability of a technology or person to accurately and precisely determine one's location and orientation two dimensionally (or three dimensionally when required) referenced to a standard geodetic system (such as World Geodetic System 1984). Navigation is the ability TARgETINg U.S. TEchNoLogIES DSS cATEgoRIzATIoN DEScRIPTIoNS to determine current and desired position (relative or absolute) and apply corrections to course, orientation, and speed to attain a desired position anywhere around the world, from sub-surface to surface and from surface to space. timing is the ability to acquire and maintain accurate and precise time from a standard (coordinated universal time), anywhere in the world and within user-defined timeliness parameters. Timing includes time transfer.
RADARS
radar is a term derived from the u.s. navy phrase radio detection and ranging. using radio waves and microwaves, radars can detect objects and determine range, altitude, direction, or speed. technology in this category is specific to the transmission and reception of radio waves and microwaves. other detection and ranging technology is not included in this category. information related to signal processing capabilities is included in this section. however, information related to signal processing software is categorized in the software category.
qUANTUM SYSTEMS
Quantum systems are engineered to predict the quantum states of atomic and subatomic particles. Physicists and engineers use quantum mechanics to conduct research in areas of quantum cryptography, quantum computing, and quantum teleportation.
SENSoRS (AcoUSTIc)
acoustic sensors are instruments that study and detect mechanical waves in gases, liquids, and solids. this category focuses on sound navigation and ranging in the very low and extremely high acoustic frequencies.
SIgNATURE coNTRoL
signature control technologies reduce or eliminate visual, signal, and auditory signs of other technologies or systems. stealth is the common term used to describe technology in this category.
SofTWARE
software is a set of instructions written by engineers that become programs and operating systems that run computers.
SPAcE SYSTEMS
space systems include combat and non-combat space-based platform designs and capabilities.
SYNThETIc BIoLogY
synthetic biology merges life science (biology) and physical science (engineering) to design and construct new biological parts, devices, and systems and the redesign of existing, natural biological systems for useful purposes.
METhoDS of oPERATIoN
AcADEMIc SoLIcITATIoN via requests for, or arrangement of, peer or scientific board reviews of academic papers or presentations, or requests to study or consult with faculty members, or applications for admission into academic institutions, departments, majors, or programs, as faculty members, students, fellows, or employees ATTEMPTED AcqUISITIoN of TEchNoLogY via agency of front companies or third countries or direct purchase of firms, these are attempts to acquire protected information in the form of controlled technologies, whether the equipment itself or diagrams, schematics, plans, spec sheets, or the like cRIMINAL AcTIvITIES via theft, these are attempts to acquire protected information with no pretense or plausibility of legitimate acquisition
ExPLoITATIoN of RELATIoNShIPS
Via established connections such as joint ventures, official agreements, foreign military sales, business arrangements, or cultural commonality, these are attempts to play upon existing legitimate or ostensibly innocuous relationships to gain unauthorized access foREIgN vISIT via visits to cleared contractor facilities that are either pre-arranged by foreign contingents or unannounced, these are attempts to gain access to and collect protected information that goes beyond that permitted and intended for sharing 
